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Abstract: This article discusses the relationship between violence and public space in light of a 
collectively perpetrated and widely televised arson attack that took place in 1993 in Sivas, 
Turkey, and its recent on-site commemorations. It draws on critical theoretical perspectives 
developed since the 1990s to consider conventional models of public space as entangled in 
violence, while also aiming to contribute to contemporary scholarship on contrarian responses to 
this entanglement. The tendency in this scholarship is to identify these responses as bottom-up, 
unscripted, performative and direct, and therefore as diametrically opposed to those identified as 
top-down, scripted, rational, and legislation-facing. The multifarious initiatives and interventions 
involving contextually shifting priorities, positions and strategies that mark the case discussed in 
this article call this tendency into question. Unassimilable under such binary oppositions, these 
initiatives and interventions have not refrained from engaging conventional models of public 
space while also developing and mobilizing contrarian ones. This article ultimately argues that 
public space is not just where violence occurs but also where its semantic disambiguation is 
pursued; this pursuit, which involves various forms of socio-political work, in turn defines and 





This article explores the markedly spatial ways violence and publicness shape each other. It does 
so in light of a collectively perpetrated and widely televised arson attack that took place in 1993 
in Sivas, central-eastern Turkey, and its recent on-site commemorations. Various spatially 
charged mobilizations of publicness have characterized both the lead-up to and the aftermath of 
the Sivas arson attack. The arson resulted from an entire afternoon of unrest in the city centre, 
which ultimately drew thousands and which the authorities chose not to quell purportedly for 
fear of antagonizing ‘the public’. It targeted individuals participating in a culture festival 
organized as a public outreach event by representatives of a demographically minor faith group. 
33 of the festival’s guests were killed as the hotel accommodating them was set alight by tens of 
assailants before an inactive law enforcement, thousands of mostly supportive onlookers, and 
live TV cameras. In the attack’s wake, those upholding the victims’ legacy launched a campaign 
for the authorities to turn the hotel into a public memorial museum. This paved the way for the 
building’s state-sponsored transformation in 2011 into a commemorative-cum-educational 
institution, which also designated it as ‘public space’. The authorities then used this designation 
to attempt at unprecedentedly banning the annual commemorative gathering held on site by those 
upholding the victims’ legacy. The following year, a major court case on the arson attack expired 
due to the statute of limitations which would not have applied had the judiciary treated the 
atrocity as a crime against humanity rather than ordinary homicide. The organizers of the annual 
commemoration responded to the ban and the expiration by identifying the site of the arson 
attack as meydan. That meydan is the Turkish-language word for ‘town square’ helped invoke 
the early 2010s’ wave of popular protests staged in and named after central squares of 
metropolises across the wider geography around Turkey. That it also denotes the socio-judicially 
charged space of ritual in Alevism helped reflect on the socio-political and judicial shortcomings 
which have characterized the atrocity’s aftermath. 
Critical theoretical perspectives developed since the 1990s have fundamentally 
reconceptualized both violence (Agamben, 1998; Farmer, 2004; Žižek, 2008; Loyd, 2012) and 
public space (Fraser, 1990; Deutsche, 1996; Negt and Kluge, 2002; Mitchell, 2003; Warner, 
2005; Iveson, 2007), helping to conclusively dispense with the deep-seated assumption that the 
two concepts are mutually antithetical. This article draws on these perspectives to consider 
violence and public space as entangled and in so doing follows a growing body of contemporary 
scholarship similarly attuned to this entanglement (Springer, 2011; Mustafa et al., 2013). When 
conceptualizing emancipatory and contrarian responses to the entanglement between violence 
and public space, scholars tend to set bottom-up, unscripted, performative and direct action in 
diametric opposition to top-down, scripted, rational, and legislation-facing intervention. 
Consider, however, the synopsis that opened this article. First, the authorities identified 
violence’s perpetrators and supportive onlookers as ‘the public’; then, those upholding the 
victims’ legacy responded to this identification by appropriating it as part of a campaign for a 
state-sponsored (i.e. publicly funded) commemorative transformation of the site of violence; 
finally, the state’s attempt to address this campaign was met with the contrarian mobilization of 
yet another notion of spatial publicness with significant socio-judicial and political undertones. 
This synopsis indicates that contrarian responses to the entanglement between violence and 
public space may mobilize multifarious initiatives and interventions involving contextually 
shifting priorities, positions and strategies irreducible to a predetermined polarization between 
forms of political work that are presumed the preserve of certain subject positions. 
Aiming to do justice to this multifariousness, I begin below by conceptualizing 
conventional models of public space as constituted in violence (Agamben, 1998), and violence as 
a force involving objective, symbolic and systemic facets (Žižek, 2008) that work in tandem 
(Loyd, 2012) rather than in isolation (Farmer, 2004). I then revisit key theorizations of 
‘counterpublicness’ (Fraser, 1990; Warner, 2005) in light of relevant spatially focused 
scholarship (Deutsche, 1996; Mitchell, 2003; Iveson, 2007; Staeheli, 2010). The aim in so doing 
is to understand space’s role in the development and mobilization of contrarian imaginaries of 
publicness vis-à-vis conventional ones. I follow by offering a history of the various context-
specific notions of public space later discussed in the article and violence’s role in it. I then 
discuss the various notions of publicness that featured in the arson attack itself and how these 
were spatially articulated and contested. This is followed by findings from my fieldwork on 
commemorative practices in and around the site of the arson attack, which were laden with 
various and often conflicting imaginaries of public space. In conclusion, I argue that public space 
is not just where violence occurs but also where its semantic disambiguation is pursued through 
multifarious and seemingly mutually antithetical forms of socio-political work. It is through this 
work, whose multifariousness ought to be appraised in light of the specific histories and contexts 
against which it is carried out, that the distinction between conventional and contrarian notions 
of public space is defined and continually redefined. 
Violence, (counter)publicnesss, and space 
Since the late twentieth century, violence has been retheorized in ways that have linked it 
inextricably to debates on public space. Consider Agamben’s (1998) modern history of 
biopolitics. He famously traced this history back to the ancient Roman homo sacer, whose 
murder lacked legal definition as it was categorized neither as sacrifice nor as crime. The history 
of modernity, argued Agamben, saw this sort of semantically ambiguous violence gradually 
become standard practice in the governing of populations and culminate in the concentration 
camp. So standard did the practice become that ‘[t]oday it is not the city but rather the camp that 
is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West’ (ibid.: 181). For Agamben, the camp as 
such underpins ‘the models by which social sciences, sociology, urban studies, and architecture 
today are trying to conceive and organize the public space of the world’s cities’ (ibid.)—models, 
to which the rest of this article refers as ‘conventional’. 
The way the relationship between violence and public space features in Agamben is 
significant for two reasons. First, it concerns much more than just the readily discernible 
instances of physical aggression, which Žižek (2008) would later call ‘subjective violence’ and 
to which understandings of violence had until then been limited when it featured, if rarely, in the 
scholarship on public space (Arendt, 1970: 63-64). That the sort of violence inflicted on homo 
sacer gradually institutionalized into standard practice epitomizes what, through Galtung (1969), 
Farmer (2004) has called a ‘structural’ force—or, in Žižek’s terms, ‘objective violence’. 
Secondly, the semantic ambiguity over homo sacer’s murder and its legal unaccountability mean 
that understanding the violence at work in it is less a question of ontology than one of meaning 
and how the latter is systematized into the law. To continue with Žižek (ibid.: 1), this merits 
another bifurcation: ‘symbolic violence’, which involves ‘language’ and ‘its imposition of a 
certain universe of meaning’, and ‘systemic violence’, which concerns ‘the smooth functioning 
of our economic and political systems’. 
The symbolic/systemic bifurcation helps alleviate a problem flagged by critics of such 
Galtung-inspired conceptualizations of ‘structural violence’ as Farmer’s (2004), which Žižek’s 
notion of ‘objective violence’ might otherwise be said to approximate (van der Linden, 2012). 
The problem concerns the assumption that what ‘structural violence’ structures is space—that, 
like space, ‘structural violence’ is not always easily contourable and, as such, operates uniformly 
across it. In a roundtable on Farmer’s concept, Wacquant has outlined three ways in which this 
assumption debilitates the analytical potential of ‘structural violence’ (Farmer, 2004: 322). First, 
it overlooks the unequal distribution of violence’s effects across the occupants of a given space; 
in fact, for many of its direct victims, ‘structural violence’ is not invisible or difficult to contour 
as they feel its effects in physical and readily discernible ways. Secondly, conflating instances of 
violence traceable to specific culprits with those involving consensual subordination through 
power relations flattens the varying degrees of responsibility involved in each instance. Finally, 
the anachronistic collapsing of various phenomena from across history under the same heading 
of ‘structural violence’ overlooks the importance of historical context and the meaning each such 
phenomenon carried at the time of its occurrence. Loyd’s (2012) take on the concept has sought 
to amend these shortcomings. For her, the two phenomena constituting the concept of ‘structural 
violence’ ought to be understood not as ‘space’ and ‘violence’ in the abstract but as context-
specific spatial imaginaries that are both constituted by unaccounted-for violent histories and 
constitutive of the continuing infliction of observable harm on particular subjects. 
This article’s usage of the adjective ‘structural’ or ‘objective’ takes its cue from such 
criticisms. Rather than compartmentalize violence into distinct forms and/or scales, it is meant to 
convey the various and mutually intersecting means through which violence is inflicted and left 
unaccounted for—namely, symbolic and systemic ones. The usage also carries with it an 
awareness of the power relations as part of which these means are employed. ‘[O]ften it is only 
by being “violent” that excluded groups have gained access to the public spaces of democracy ... 
it is precisely such “violence” that has forced the liberalization of public space laws’ (Mitchell, 
2003: 52). In using the inverted comma and referencing laws, Mitchell highlights not only the 
role of semantics and legislation in negotiating the relationship between violence and public 
space but also power’s centrality to this negotiation. The tendency among those in power to 
identify collectively manifested challenges to socio-spatial marginalization as ‘violent’ 
depoliticizes not only these manifestations but also the concept of violence as it flattens the 
uneven power relations structuring both (Dikeç, 2017). Therefore, exploring conventional 
models of public space as the stuff of the symbolic and systemic infliction and legitimization of 
‘violence’ requires that this concept be understood as the violation of the bodily and 
psychological integrity of the less powerful. 
Taking Mitchell’s argument seriously also means to avoid dismissing the politics of 
conventional models of public space as oppressive or celebrating it as emancipatory and to 
understand it instead as the stuff of socio-political contestation. Space, after all, is political not 
because it embodies mutually conflicting interests or power positions but insofar as it becomes 
‘the polemical place where a wrong can be addressed’, ‘equality can be demonstrated’, and the 
otherwise ‘naturalized orders of domination’ can be interrupted by those they seek to dominate 
(Dikeç, 2005: 172). Similarly, the ‘publicness’ of public space is not ‘preordained’ but rather 
shaped and continually reshaped through ‘the struggle for rights’ and for ‘social justice’ 
(Mitchell, 2003: 35-36). If resolving violence’s semantic ambiguity is part and parcel of this 
struggle, precisely what sorts of spatial imaginaries might arise from such struggles and how 
might they do so in relation to conventional models of public space? This is the larger of the two 
enquiries that guide my empirical analysis. 
While not always necessarily spatially focused, theories of counterpublicness developed 
contemporarily with the abovementioned retheorizations of violence are pivotal to these 
questions. Foremost among these theories is Fraser’s (1990), which was premised on a critique 
of Habermas’ (1991) idealization of the bourgeois public sphere as civil, accessible, rational, 
and the only public sphere at that. For Fraser, ‘not only were there always a plurality of 
competing publics but the relations between bourgeois publics and other publics were always 
conflictual’ (1990: 61). She called these ‘other publics’ as ‘counterpublics’, spheres across which 
‘subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses’ that permit ‘oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’ (ibid.: 67). For Fraser, Habermas’ ‘sharp 
separation of (associational) civil society and the state’ allowed only for ‘weak publics’—publics 
that engage merely in ‘opinion-formation’ while leaving other essential business such as 
‘decision-making’, ‘self-management’, ‘inter-public coordination’, and ‘political accountability’ 
to states (Fraser, 1990: 75-76). Conversely, counterpublics are strong publics; they facilitate not 
only ‘withdrawal and regroupment’ but also ‘agitational activities directed toward wider publics’ 
(Fraser, 1990: 68). That counterpublics are conceptualized in contradistinction to neither privacy 
nor the state but to other publics and that they continually aspire to become publics warrant 
parenthesizing the concept’s adjectival prefix, as in (counter)publicness. 
The rise of radical democracy theories around the millennial turn meant that Fraser would 
be criticized for paradoxically reproducing the very theoretical sway on which she challenged 
Habermas: the idealization of full integration, reasoned deliberation and harmonious 
convergence as the ultimate aspirations of publicness. Deutsche, for instance, conceptualized 
publicness as ‘the abandonment of the belief in an absolute basis of social unity’ and in ‘an 
essential identity or true interest’, which renders it ‘the uncertain social realm’ that 
simultaneously constitutes and jeopardizes ‘the meaning of the people’ (1996: 268). 
Reconceptualized in this light, counter-ness refers not to a quality of predetermined agendas but 
to (counter)publics’ constituents’ willingness to ‘encounter others’ (ibid.: 286; cf. Dikeç and 
Swyngedouw, 2017: 9)—ways of being other than one’s own—and to allow such encounters to 
continually reshape the agendas in question. But this also raises a question: precisely what might 
constitute these encounters as such, or the otherness of the others being encountered? 
According to Warner’s theory of ‘publics and counterpublics’, the answer to this question 
hinges on form rather than content. (Counter)publics, for him, operate against ‘not just a general 
or wider public, but a dominant one’, where the dominance concerns ‘speech genres’, ‘modes of 
address’ and ‘media’ as opposed to just ‘ideas or policy’ (Warner, 2005: 119; cf. Negt and 
Kluge, 2002). Warner has argued that rational-critical hermeneutics is foremost among the 
dominant forms and that (counter)publics challenge it by preferring ‘embodied sociability’ over 
‘the ideology of reading’ or ‘performance’ over ‘print’ (Warner, 2005: 123). This argument has 
resonated with recent analyses of violence’s relationship to public space. ‘Spontaneous action 
and performance’ (Mustafa et al., 2013: 14) and ‘unscripted interaction’ (Springer, 2011: 526) 
have been considered conducive to contrarian positions, which have been categorically identified 
as ‘non-violent’ while ‘violence’ has been associated, in Arendtian fashion, with the annihilation 
of politics (Mustafa et al., 2013) or with cyclical mechanisms of domination and submission that 
foreclose any possibility of emancipation (Springer, 2011). Such arguments and analyses have 
insightfully avoided reproducing rationality and civility as preconditions for (counter)publicness. 
But they have largely evaded the question of precisely how the boundary between the rational-
critical and its other is probed and constituted, and how violence bears upon this process as a 
phenomenon whose meaning is not necessarily always unambiguously determined prior to its 
occurrence. Hence the more specific enquiry framing my empirical analysis. 
If the theories referenced in this section are not necessarily all spatially focused, this is 
not to suggest that they are readily transferable to discussions on public space. It is to argue that 
imaginaries of ‘public space’ are not just constitutive of but also constituted and reconstituted 
time and again by claims to publicness. ‘If the publicly accessible spaces of the city are easy to 
understand as “locations” for the public sphere, it is important to remember that they are not the 
only locations’ (Staeheli, 2010: 72; cf. Mitchell 2003: 35). This article considers the site where 
the Sivas arson attack took place as epitomizing just such a caveat. Few sites are further from the 
conventional image of public space than a building located on a side street, one which long 
served as a private hotel to then become host to a 9-to-5 state institution (Figure 1). But this has 
not prevented the site from becoming subject to spatial imaginaries of publicness and, as 
discussed below, the arson attack is what has led it to become that. This is not to say that the 
site’s physicality is irrelevant to these imaginaries. That ‘publics have no proper location … does 
not mean that all kinds of space are equivalent or equally available for those engaged in struggles 
to make publics’ (Iveson, 2007: 13). The physicality of each location through which imaginaries 
of publicness become manifest bears upon their political potentials and limitations. Assessing 
these potentials and limitations therefore requires that such locations be subjected to ‘empirical 
analysis’ rather than being celebrated as ideal public spaces or dismissed as failed ones (ibid.). It 
is this sort of an analysis that I seek to offer below through an ethnography of spatial 
commemoration in and around the site of the 1993 Sivas arson attack.[1] 
Concepts of spatial publicness in modern Turkey and their relationship to violence 
Before proceeding with empirical analysis, some contextualization is in order regarding the 
histories through which conventional models of public space came into being in the geography 
hosting today’s Turkey and their relation to the question of violence. Conditioned by Western-
European-style consumerism, the nineteenth-century ‘birth of public space’ in the Ottoman 
Empire was less that than the marginalization and eventual replacement of various other already-
existing sites of socialization attended especially by the Muslim majority (Göçek and Özyüksel, 
2012). This systemic transformation not only continued unabated but also assumed a new facet 
in the early twentieth century as ethnically driven nationalisms gained prominence. The various 
ethnic homogenization policies implemented between 1913 and 1950, including the deportation 
of the Ottoman Armenians which paved the way to the Armenian genocide, prevented citizens 
from performing difference and in so doing established the hegemony of Turkish nationalism in 
and over ‘public space’ (Üngör, 2011: 212-34). This history is directly pertinent to this article’s 
empirical focus: Sivas province was among the genocide’s epicentres, as a third of its population 
at the time was non-Muslim and two-thirds of its non-Muslims were Armenian (Marchand and 
Perrier, 2015: 26). 
The impact that ethnic homogenization in early-twentieth-century Turkey made on public 
space has become manifest in specific sites. Many of today’s publicly owned lands, including the 
former Presidential Palace part of which has long served as a public museum, were in fact 
confiscated during such violent episodes as the Armenian genocide that to this day remain 
unreckoned with (Kezer, 2012). Squares, too, are among the physical spatial manifestations of 
this homogenization, a prominent example being Ankara’s Ulus (‘Nation’) Square. It was built 
out of a site called Taşhan Square, which, throughout the Ottoman era, had gradually come to 
host various activities typically associated with ‘public spaces’, ranging from political 
demonstrations to commercial activity (Sargın, 2004). Physically, transformations of the sort that 
converted Taşhan into Ulus involved government-led spatial interventions premised on the West 
Central European approach to urban planning and its model of the public square (Bozdoğan, 
2001: 67-77). Social substance was forged through collective performances of national 
homogeneity and citizen-led campaigns for monuments to populate squares like Ulus, aiming 
towards the absolute coalescence of the citizenry and the emergent nation-state (Sargın, 2004: 
665; Yüksekli and Akalın, 2011: 651). The radicalness of these interventions was tempered with 
nominal continuity; the word meydan, long employed to denote sites like Taşhan whose 
identification as ‘public space’ owed more to historical habituality than to prescription by design, 
was adopted as the official descriptor for the ‘new’ squares. 
The second half of the twentieth century saw violence feature increasingly frequently in 
these squares. Non-Muslim populations identified as minorities under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, 
which had secured international legal recognition for the then-nascent Republic of Turkey, were 
assaulted in episodes of ‘civil violence organized and/or overlooked by the government’ such as 
the mid-1950s’ pogroms in central Istanbul (Batuman, 2015: 892). The question of semantics 
was central to such episodes. Mainstream politicians and journalists identified them not as 
‘violence’ but as ‘the people’s reaction’ to some other contemporaneous event, which in the mid-
1950s’ case was the ethnic conflict in Cyprus. That official public spaces played a central role in 
many of these ‘people’s reactions’—for instance, Istanbul’s central square Taksim in the mid-
1950s’ pogroms—amplified violence’s centrality to the spatial ways in which the people and the 
publicness in question co-constituted each other. As the century progressed, such ‘reactions’ 
turned inward to engulf the legal majority, an example being the anti-communist assault on an 
anti-imperialist student rally held in Taksim Square in 1969. The intensification of ideological 
conflict in the 1970s turned spaces like Taksim Square into ‘a symbolic battlefield’ over which 
mutually conflicting publics competed (ibid.: 892-93). The 12 September 1980 military coup 
brought this process to an end and did so not only through numerous restrictions on social rights 
but also through its use of squares like Taksim for state rallies where the ‘popularity’ of such 
restrictive policies was performed (Baykan and Hatuka, 2010). 
The mid-1980s saw the restoration of electoral democracy and the neoliberal curtailment 
of the state’s socio-economic presence, inaugurating a period Habermasian accounts have 
associated with ‘the expansion of the public sphere’ (Göle, 1994; Yavuz, 2009: 58). But the 
period also saw other developments overlooked in these accounts, such as the imposition of 
‘martial law and war in the southeast’ and various ‘repressive’ measures in ‘prisons, courtrooms, 
airport checkpoints, streets, universities, neighbourhoods, or through media and other means in 
one’s home’ (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 132). Indeed, operating in entanglement with ‘free market’ 
forces, the state continued to influence ‘public life’ so significantly as to empirically invalidate 
distinctions between it and civil society, and to preclude basing one’s understanding of 
publicness on such a distinction (ibid.; Özyürek, 2006: 7-8). Evidencing this influence is the 
term kamusal alan, which has come to serve as the primary Turkish-language rendition of 
‘public space’. While the adjective kamusal is intended to convey publicness, alan may mean 
both ‘space’ and ‘sphere’. Kamusal is obtained by suffixing the noun kamu with -sal, which 
implies relation. Kamu may mean ‘the state’ as well as ‘the people’, or even ‘public’ with 
markedly libertarian undertones, as evident in the word kamuoyu (public opinion) (Özbek, 2005). 
Despite these ambiguities, the late 1980s and early 1990s—the very period that Habermasian 
accounts have associated with the expansion of the public sphere in Turkey—saw kamusal 
alan rise to prominence, especially among scholars of urbanism and architecture, as the Turkish-
language rendition of ‘public space’ (Açıkgöz, 2004). But, as the etymology and history 
provided here suggest, any expansion that kamusal alan is alleged to have undergone always 
necessarily entails subjugation to, rather than just emancipation from, such dominant forces as 
those of the state and/or the market (Çınar, 2005: 38). 
Entanglements between violence and public space during the Sivas arson attack 
The Sivas arson attack took place on 2 July 1993, at a time when the 1990s’ debates on kamusal 
alan in Turkey were in full swing. Rather than a sudden assault, it was the culmination of an 
entire afternoon of unrest in central Sivas instigated by tens of individuals, ultimately attracting 
thousands. Judging by the slogans they chanted, the ring-leaders were anti-secularists and 
Islamic fundamentalists protesting certain aspects of the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Festival then 
being held in the city (Tüleylioğlu, 2010: 47-51). The festival, whose guests were targeted in the 
arson, was organized by an association representing followers of the Alevi faith, one of Turkey’s 
demographically minor social groups whose practices and rituals differ fundamentally from 
those associated with Sunnism—the predominant denomination of Islam in Turkey and in central 
Sivas. The festival had been planned as an annual event when it was inaugurated in 1978. This 
plan was stillborn due to socio-political unrest across late 1970s’ Turkey, which also engulfed 
Alevis as they were violently targeted in their hundreds by right-wing militants in central and 
eastern Anatolian cities like Malatya, Çorum, Sivas and Maraş, prompting their exodus to 
metropolises like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, or even beyond, to Europe (Eral, 1995). This was 
followed by the 1980 coup and its severe rights restrictions, meaning that it took another decade 
before the organizers were able to hold the festival annually as initially intended. 
Come 1993, the festival was being organized for the fourth time. Still, it had the quality 
of a debut; for the first time, the festival’s venues included those in central Sivas instead of being 
confined to a historically significant Alevi village in the city’s hinterland as they had been in the 
first three episodes. Moreover, contrary to its precedents, the 1993 episode was programmed as 
not just an Alevism-related event but a further-reaching one. It involved writers, performers and 
musicians, who were not necessarily Alevis but renowned in Turkey’s left-leaning circles. In 
other words, the festival organizers’ aspiration to reach—and, in so doing, constitute—publics 
wider than their fellow Alevis mobilized both space and programming. If this aspiration indexed 
Alevis’ return to the geography that the 1970s’ violent episodes had forced them to flee, it would 
not just restore the previous status quo marked by the commonplace opposition of public to 
private life and by faith’s strict association with the latter. The ‘return’ would endeavour to 
ensure that Alevism ‘is no longer confined to secrecy and has entered the public space’ 
(Sökefeld, 2002: 169). 
            But the chain of events that culminated in the arson attack would reiterate that the ‘public 
space’ being ‘entered’ was less a socio-politically neutral container than one whose publicness is 
entangled in the question of violence. First, with only days until the festival, an anonymous 
leaflet addressed to ‘the Muslim public’ and posted through letterboxes in central Sivas incited 
violence against the festival’s keynote speaker Aziz Nesin, the pretext being his recent 
declaration that he might commission a Turkish-language translation of Salman 
Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (Tüleylioğlu, 2010: 38-39). The night before the arson attack another 
such leaflet appeared; this time, the addressee was ‘our people’ and a postscript requested that 
‘readers reproduce this text and circulate it further’ (Aşut, 1994: 323). Meanwhile, right-leaning 
local newspapers agitated against the festival, questioning especially the ‘public’ funding it 
received through the Culture Ministry held by the left-wing partner of the then-governing grand 
coalition. The agitation centred on a ‘Minstrels Monument’, which the Ministry had funded and 
placed outside the culture centre that was the festival’s main venue to mark the occasion. The 
newspapers speculated that the monument did not honour all minstrels as per its official name 
but clandestinely commemorated Pir Sultan Abdal—the sixteenth-century minstrel venerated in 
Alevism, after whom the festival was named—which infuriated them as they considered him 
‘one of the foremost rebels in Anatolia’s history’ (Bozgeyik, 1993). ‘Why, how, and by whom’ 
taxes were dedicated to such a project kept secret from ‘the public’ was posed as a question that 
ought to preoccupy ‘the people of Sivas’ (Hürdoğan, 1993a). The local ministerial representative 
released a statement to quell the speculations targeting the monument, but also pledged to ‘tear it 
down if necessary’ (Hürdoğan, 1993b). 
The claims to and mobilizations of publicness that marked these incendiary reactions to 
various aspects of the festival would assume an overtly spatial character on the day of the arson 
attack. Present in Sivas throughout the festival was a group of reporters from a conservative-
leaning nationwide network launched just half a year before the arson attack when the state’s 
monopoly on radio and television broadcasting had ended—a development Habermasian 
accounts of this period in Turkey often feature as symptomatic of the expansion of the public 
sphere. At a book exhibition held in the courtyard of a public museum in the morning of the 
festival’s second day, one of the reporters from this network challenged the abovementioned 
author Aziz Nesin on his plans to translate the Satanic Verses. Embarking on ad hominem, the 
reporter brought up the author’s being a public atheist and produced the past couple of days’ 
newspapers and leaflets berating him and his participation in the festival. Nesin’s response that ‘I 
don’t believe Allah’s word; I would need to lose my mind if I were to do so’ (Tüleylioğlu, 2010: 
46) was met with attempts by some members of the small crowd watching the encounter to lunge 
at him. This encounter was something of an omen due not only to its being the first instance of 
physical hostility towards a festival guest, but also to what the reporter’s contribution to it 
foreshadowed about the press’ role in the arson attack: that this role was not merely one of 
giving publicity to violence but also involved its incitation (cf. Chalfont et al., 1980). The 1990s’ 
demonopolization of broadcasting that some, as mentioned in the previous section, have 
categorically celebrated for its contribution to ‘the expansion of the public sphere’ was therefore 
thrown into sharp relief as having expanded conventional imaginaries of publicness underpinned 
by violent homogenization rather than just the range of (counter)publics allowed into this sphere. 
About an hour later, a couple dozen people gathered outside a nearby mosque after 
Friday prayers to head to the culture centre hosting one of the festival’s events. Chanting slogans 
reminiscent of the abovementioned anonymous leaflets, they defaced the Minstrels Monument 
located in the building’s forecourt. This constituted the threshold where the previous days’ 
mutually constitutive calls to publicness and to violence translated from discourse into practice. 
The assailants then turned to the offices of the Governor to protest the state’s providing the 
festival with public funding. Having shuttled once more between the culture centre and the 
Governorship and having been pushed back by the police in both locations, they went on to 
surround the nearby hotel hosting many of the festival’s guests. As the assailants grew in number 
and reached their hundreds, members of the local government and law enforcement attended the 
scene. Their calls for dispersal were met by the crowd with three prerequisites, among which was 
the removal of the Minstrels Monument (Tüleylioğlu, 2010: 488-92). The authorities complied 
and brought the toppled monument to the crowd as proof of their compliance. But this only 
further encouraged the assailants, who seized the monument and dragged it to the forecourt of 
the hotel where they burnt it, constituting the penultimate stage before the building itself was set 
ablaze (ibid.: 186-87). 
The abovementioned broadcasting network continued reporting from Sivas in the run-up 
to the arson. This meant that the festival guests sheltering inside the hotel from the assailants 
outside were able to watch TV reports on the events unfolding around them. While the crowd 
kept growing in number, chanting inflammatory slogans, and attacking the building with stones, 
the reports periodically and misleadingly announced that ‘there has been unrest in Sivas, but the 
situation is now under control’ (Özbakır, 2010). It was not until the building was set alight that 
they reflected a more up-to-date account of the events. The way the events were reported 
therefore had a twofold contribution to the violence. Not only did it hinder various attempts to 
alert the authorities to the urgency of the situation when the arson attack was still preventable, 
including those by victims-to-be who made phone calls from inside the hotel to dignitaries they 
personally knew, albeit to no avail (Tüleylioğlu, 2010: 50). Choosing to broadcast images of the 
event at its most visually sensational moment—an inhabited building set ablaze before the eyes 
of thousands of spectators—amplified the marginalization of those identifying with the victims 
and the legitimacy of those outside the hotel as constitutive of ‘the people’. Hence the 
President’s remarks the following day that called the arson attack ‘an isolated incident’ where 
‘the public were agitated’ due to ‘severe provocation’ and praised the law enforcements’ inaction 
for refusing to ‘pit the public and the security forces against each other’ (Tüleylioğlu, 2010: 61-
62). Similarly, when asked about the casualties, the Prime Minister referred to the victims and 
survivors as ‘individuals’, while highlighting that ‘thankfully our people outside the hotel were 
unharmed’ (ibid.: 59). These remarks recalled the descriptor ‘popular reaction’ which, as 
discussed in the previous section, members of various administrations throughout the twentieth 
century had preferred to use when referring to certain episodes of political violence. In so doing, 
they demonstrated from day one that the stakes involved in the arson attack included not just 
what had occurred but also how it would both define and be defined by notions of publicness. 
If the state representatives’ response to the arson attack followed the tradition outlined in 
the previous section insofar as it saw in violence an opportunity to reinvigorate the socio-
political homogenization underpinning conventional imaginaries of publicness, it was 
nevertheless particular in its spatiality—in its mapping of ‘the people’ on to the hotel’s ‘outside’. 
Those upholding the victims’ legacy have since challenged this by reclaiming the space as a site 
for commemoration. Their very first defiance of the ban on commemorative gatherings at the 
site, which had been instituted the day after the arson attack, occurred on 4 September, the 
locally celebrated anniversary of the ‘1919 Sivas Congress’, an official historiographical 
milestone in the Turkish National Campaign (1919-22). Three associations founded by Alevis 
originally hailing from Sivas but headquartered in Istanbul and Ankara brought 300 of their 
members to Sivas to attend the official public ceremony marking the anniversary. Halfway 
through the event, they performed an act of détournement by suddenly marching to the hotel to 
commemorate the arson attack’s victims (Hakikat, 1993). This set the tone for the annual 
commemoration held on site by those upholding the victims’ legacy since 1994. 
Challenges to the spatiality characterizing the authorities’ response to the arson attack 
involved not only reclaiming the space outside the hotel but also obliging them to affiliate with 
its inside. This is evident in the most significant commemorative campaign ran by those claiming 
the victims’ legacy. Launched just days after 2 July 1993 by representatives of various left-
leaning political parties and professional organizations, this ongoing campaign demands that the 
site of the arson attack be turned into a public memorial museum. Although, following the attack, 
the site was fast repaired and returned to business as a hotel, the campaign has continued 
unabated over the years while also placing increasing emphasis on precisely who the addressee 
is—the state. The emphasis was thrown into sharp relief in the mid-2000s when Europe-based 
Alevi associations had amassed enough funds to purchase the hotel and to transform it in 
whatever manner they saw fit but decided otherwise. A senior member of these associations 
explained the decision thus: 
To accept a memorial museum that is not supported by state officials means also to 
unjustly claim responsibility for the Sivas massacre. The state authorities, both past and 
present, are responsible for and guilty of the Sivas massacre—both because they were 
negligent and because they have since then portrayed it as an ordinary event (Kaplan, 
2008). 
Framed as such, the campaign grew in popularity throughout the 2000s and inspired further 
campaigns regarding numerous other sites of political violence in which those upholding the 
victims’ legacy have considered the authorities culpable. These campaigns dovetailed with 
various intellectuals’ calls for Turkey to ‘reckon with’ its violent past (Sancar, 2007), which 
culminated in the 2009 government initiative known popularly as Demokratik Açılım 
(Democratic Opening). The initiative consisted of a series of workshops with non-governmental 
actors and representatives of historically underrepresented groups such as Kurds, Alevis, and 
non-Muslims, of which senior cabinet members spoke as an opportunity for ‘the state to revise 
its memory’ (T.C. Devlet Bakanlığı, 2010: 6, 17). 
That the state convert the site of the arson attack into a memorial museum was among the 
five demands raised during the so-called Alevi workshops. This kickstarted a process in which 
the site hosted the first-ever ministerial-level commemorative visit, was expropriated in late 
2010, and underwent a state-sponsored architectural transformation project in spring 2011. A 
press preview held in June revealed that the building had become a commemorative-cum-
educational institution named the Science and Culture Centre and open to the public for visits 
throughout the working week. My fieldwork in Sivas began in the immediate aftermath of this 
transformation and took place at intervals over the following two years. It comprised interviews 
with various state officials involved in the Science and Culture Centre project as well as an 
ethnography of the daily goings-on inside the building and the on-site commemoration held 
annually by those claiming the victims’ legacy. 
Mobilizing public spatial imaginaries through commemorations of the arson attack 
The commemorative centrepiece of the Science and Culture Centre is a so-called Memory 
Corner—a 70-squaremetre room hosting a three-by-four-and-a-half-metre stainless-steel wall 
displaying a list of names, a set of fountainlets, and two statements (Figure 2). The number of 
fountainlets is equal to that of the names commemorated: 37. This number, therefore, is not 
limited to the 33 festival participants and the two hotel employees killed inside the hotel but also 
includes the two individuals who were among the crowd outside and who died as it was belatedly 
dispersed by law enforcement. The authorities have justified this as ‘a human-centric’ refusal ‘to 
discriminate between the dead’ (Yalçınkaya and Ceylan, 2011). The names are in first-name-
alphabetical order, meaning one of these two individuals leads the list. 
One of the two statements the Memory Corner displays is more relevant to this article 
than the other, and so will be explored at greater length.[2] It reads, ‘Regardless of the different 
ideas, different beliefs in society, there is no unachievable task, no unsurpassable obstacle for a 
nation that knows how to act in national unity and togetherness’, and is attributed to Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, who famously led the Turkish National Campaign and served as the founding 
president of the Republic of Turkey until his death in 1938. The attribution is conveyed through 
Kemal’s iconic signature and a gilded mask portraying his face, which accompany the statement. 
This has led the Memory Corner to resemble the so-called ‘Atatürk corners’ that have long 
populated the lobbies of Turkey’s official institutions, public buildings, and schools (Navaro-
Yashin, 2002: 188-203). The rest of the Science and Culture Centre is geared towards 
schoolchildren aged between 7 and 14, who are intended to visit the site with their teachers. The 
educational spaces look markedly different from the building’s commemorative section; they are 
brightly-lit, furnished in curvaceous lines and vibrant shades of red, blue and yellow, and 
sporadically decorated with Olympic rings. 
According to the construction engineer in his late 30s who ran the transformation project, 
the building’s various functions were determined by senior government representatives, who 
‘concurred that this place should become a common [ortak] one’. For him, even the building’s 
name embodied this objective: rather than reference certain events or people upheld by 
nationalist historiography as per standard practice in Turkey, the name reads ‘Science and 
Culture Centre—a thoroughly neutral, kamu name’ befitting a building ‘identified with kamu’. 
Indeed, the term kamu (public, the state, the people) featured prominently in the hotel’s 
transformation into Science and Culture Centre even before construction began. It is the root of 
kamulaştırma (literally: making kamu), the Turkish-language word for expropriation, which 
constituted the first step towards the building’s transformation. The term was also central to the 
way the architect commissioned for the project reflected on it. ‘Like all kamu buildings around 
the world, this, too, is a heavy, oppressive and serious building’, he admitted. The term indicated 
neutrality for the architect just as it did for the engineer. That the building was redesigned with 
an awareness of its ‘belonging to kamu’, he suggested, has helped accommodate future scenarios 
in which the authorities may decide to use parts of it for various other purposes. For him, the 
decorative use of Olympic rings—a world-renowned motif of national and/or political 
impartiality (Lennartz, 2001/2002)—and the first-name-alphabetical order of the name list were 
also evidence of the building’s alleged neutrality. 
My research inside the building revealed that the architectural elements through which its 
alleged neutrality was forged also included the upper four floors that constitute the bulk of the 
building and remain empty to this day. When faced with visitors’ criticism, employees invoked 
the emptiness of these floors. When a couple in their mid-30s lambasted the memorial wall’s 
inclusion of ‘assailants’ names’, the employee tending them admitted to the ‘imperfection’ of the 
Science and Culture Centre. But he stressed that this was just a well-intentioned start; in fact, the 
bulk of the building remained empty, and feedback of the sort provided by the couple could well 
influence what might later become of it. When a father and his teenage son complained that the 
building had become a Science and Culture Centre rather than a memorial museum proper, the 
employee tending them pointed yet again to the upper floors. Presuming that the father and son 
were Alevis as per the affiliation of the organizations that have most ardently campaigned for an 
on-site memorial museum, the employee claimed that there was a possibility for handing the 
upper levels over to an Alevi association, which could then use them as it sees fit: ‘turn them into 
a museum, or perhaps even into a cemevi’ (place of Alevi worship; literally: house of gathering). 
The idle upper floors proved instrumental to dealing with visitor criticism of an anti-
museum nature as well as a pro-museum one. When faced with visitors who found even the 
Memory Corner too significant a concession granted to those campaigning for an on-site 
memorial museum, the employee highlighted that the building had after all been expropriated 
(kamulaştırıldı); it now belonged to kamu, who, ‘if necessary, might turn it into a post office or a 
bank’, the upper floors evidencing that definitive plans in this respect were still in the making. In 
sum, employees mobilized the upper floors’ emptiness—a quality certain spatial theorists have 
considered as enabling greater ‘publicness’ by allowing ‘interpretation’ (Spector, 2014: 183-
184)—to attempt at giving substance to the alleged neutrality of the Science and Culture Centre 
through a performance of openness to participation and willingness to adapt. 
Larger-scale implications of such performances of and claims to neutrality enacted 
through various aspects of the Science and Culture Centre became evident during the 2011 
episode of the annual commemoration held in Sivas by those upholding the victims’ legacy. Held 
in the immediate aftermath of the building’s relaunch as Science and Culture Centre, the 
commemoration was declared illegal by the local authorities for the first time in its 18-year 
history. The event’s organizers, who comprise representatives of various left-leaning 
organizations and Alevi associations, met with the Governor of Sivas a week before the 
anniversary as per usual to inform him about the commemoration, only to be replied that the 
building is now ‘kamusal alan and therefore no longer available for such gatherings’ (Yıldız, 
2011). Although the commemoration eventually went ahead, the attempted ban materialized in 
police barricades mounted 15 metres ahead of the building, which prevented flower-laying at its 
doorstep except by a handful of victims’ relatives and senior Alevi figures. The police also 
barricaded every side street leading to the spot, except that which carried the commemorative 
procession. Ironically, the organizers had already decided that commemoration participants 
would refuse to enter the building in order to perform their disapproval of various aspects of the 
Science and Culture Centre, including its general failure to deliver a museum proper but more 
specifically its all-encompassing name list, against which victims’ relatives had also filed a 
lawsuit (Benli 2016). Still, flower-laying at the doorstep was a gesture that hundreds of 
commemoration participants tended to perform every year and, when more than just the handful 
allowed past the barricade insisted on doing so, the police reacted by using tear gas. This 
triggered a brief scuffle between around 20 young activists and the police, snapshots of which 
populated mainstream newspapers’ front pages the morning after to underprop allegations 
regarding the violent tendencies of commemoration participants. 
The 2012 episode of the on-site commemoration was heavily influenced by a court 
decision delivered in March that year, when one of the lawsuits on the arson attack lapsed due to 
the statute of limitations (Tanyeri-Erdemir, 2012). Hundreds gathered outside the courthouse in 
Ankara during the hearing to promulgate that, had the judiciary treated the arson attack as a 
crime against humanity rather than a simple case of homicide, the case would not have been 
subject to the statute of limitations (Ziflioğlu, 2012). When the outcome of the hearing was 
declared, the gathering turned into an indefinite sit-in. This was soon dispersed by the police 
with tear gas and water cannons. 
A few months later, the commemoration in Sivas saw the barricades move further up 
along the route of the procession by about half-a-kilometre and therefore closer to the 
predominantly Alevi-inhabited neighbourhood whence the event departs every year. A sit-in 
ensued, which led the police to move the barricades back to where they had been in 2011. 
Virtually all side streets leading to the site were also sealed as they had been the previous year. 
What was different from the previous year was the type of barricade mounted in the building’s 
forecourt. The simple plastic shields employed previously were replaced with a two-metre-high 
steel barrier, which the police have since continued to mount at the site on commemoration day. 
Also different from 2011 was the proactivity with which the commemoration’s organizing 
committee responded to the provocative potential of these ‘public safety’ instruments. The bus 
that had just led the procession was now parked sideways to cover the steel barrier (Figure 3). 
This was significant not only because it reduced the likelihood of confrontation with the police 
but also because it created a spatial arrangement that helped orient the entire body of activists 
towards the Science and Culture Centre. Each speaker addressing the event was therefore able to 
use the building as the object of their successive denunciations of the arson attack, the 
authorities’ and the media’s roles in it, the failure of the site’s architectural transformation to 
deliver a museum, and the recent lapsing of the court case due to the statute of limitations. But 
the building was also mobilized as a datum point against which to articulate alternatives, as the 
speeches culminated in the following remarks by the chairperson of the Alevi association that 
leads the commemoration’s organizing committee: ‘the court case on this massacre is not held in 
palaces of justice; it is held here in this meydan!’ 
The chairperson’s use of the term meydan in reference to the otherwise nondescript space 
occupied by the commemoration is significant for at least two reasons. First, meydan denotes the 
socio-judicial and spiritual platform in Alevism where grievances are raised, disputes are 
resolved, and misdoings are penalized (Shankland, 2003: 127-28). Secondly, as explained in the 
section before last, meydan is the Turkish-language word for public square. Its variants are 
employed across the geographical triangle demarcated by and inclusive of Libya, Ukraine and 
India to convey the same meaning. The word, moreover, has recently acquired an overtly 
political significance across this geography due to the numerous waves of mass protest which 
took place across its metropolises and which were named after the central square in each 
metropolis, including Istanbul. A direct link between the latter and the Sivas arson attack 
materialized in mid-June 2013 when the police’s crackdown on activists occupying Istanbul’s 
central square Taksim and the adjacent Gezi Park sparked a new wave of anti-violence protest in 
the form of individuals standing motionless in Turkey’s cities. Among the venues of this protest 
was the forecourt of Science and Culture Centre (Verstraete, 2013: 8), providing further 
substance to its association with the concept of meydan. In sum, those espousing such an 
association have not so much repudiated the kamusal-ness that the Science and Culture Centre 
project has attributed to the site of the arson attack as they have repurposed it towards the 
collective expression of dissent and the pursuit of social justice.[3] 
Concluding remarks 
This article has worked from the axiom that, if violence and conventional models of public space 
are inextricably linked to each other, untangling this link is less a question of ontology than one 
of semantics. Put differently, violence and publicness are defined and continually redefined 
through each other in particular contexts and through specific events, and these definitions in 
turn become legally and culturally systematized into spatial imaginaries. Importantly, these 
processes of definition and systematization are causal rather than teleological; each is an 
opportunity to expose and, in so doing, challenge the conventional model of public space it 
features. The 1993 Sivas arson attack was such a process in which a concept of ‘publicness’ 
characterized by a double homogenization—one which involved the state’s absolute coalescence 
with a citizenry conceived as a socio-politically uniform entity—was spatially mobilized to, first, 
incite violence, secondly, give violence physical visibility, and, finally, obscure the uneven 
power relations structuring the varying degrees of culpability for violence. If those upholding the 
victims’ legacy were aware of this threefold mobilization, they sought to challenge it not just by 
condemning it but also by precipitating its architectural materialization. Hence their campaign 
for a state-sponsored memorial museum on site, to which the authorities responded with the 
Science and Culture Centre—a project that mobilized various spatial imaginaries rooted in the 
concept of kamu (public, the state, the people) including kamulaştırma (expropriation; literally: 
making kamu) and kamusal alan (public space/sphere). 
This architectural materialization gave the campaigners a reference point against which to 
demonstrate their own spatial imaginaries of publicness. But performance and direct action, 
which involved relating to the site as meydan (public square, and socio-judicially charged space 
of Alevi ritual) and refusing to enter the building unless its ‘neutral’ attitude towards the arson 
attack was rectified, constituted only one form of such demonstrations. These were combined 
with a rational-critical hermeneutics evident in the campaigners’ legal challenge against the 
name list, which contrasted with the socio-politically homogenizing rational-criticality 
characterizing the model of public space that became manifest through the Science and Culture 
Centre’s self-proclaimed neutrality. Indeed, it is this combination that from the outset has 
characterized the activism around the arson attack, which has not only subverted conventional 
imaginaries of publicness by compelling the spatial crystallization of their semantic and systemic 
entanglement in violence but also staged contrarian ones in the form of commemorative 
gatherings on site. 
These processes, in which contrarian models of public space have developed dialectically 
with conventional ones and have combined the methods of rational-criticality with those of 
embodied sociability, are therefore far from unscripted or spontaneous. Nor might they be rigidly 
formalized as bottom-up or direct versus top-down or legislation-facing. Still, there is a 
distinguishing characteristic of (counter)public-spatial imaginaries that these processes indicate: 
an awareness that the context-independent acceptance of such formal-methodological 
oppositions might itself contribute to the semantic means through which violence is legally and 
culturally systematized and, in so doing, might perpetuate conventional models of public space. 
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Notes 
[1] This exploration of commemoration dovetails with my larger project, which reconsiders a 
tendency prevalent among students of commemorative practices (Çaylı 2018). The tendency is to 
prematurely declare events as complete by misunderstanding the various ways in which they are 
represented, for instance through spatial commemoration, as constituting their aftermath rather 
than their ongoing development. This becomes especially troubling when dealing with violent 
events as it takes for granted a sharp separation between violence and culture: violence is implied 
as limited to the instance of physical aggression and thus the symbolic and systemic ways in 
which commemoration’s ‘cultural’ mechanisms of naming, appropriating and displacing the past 
contribute to it are overlooked. Questioning this tendency through a focus on publicness might 
help treat ‘public’ as an analytical concept rather than a descriptive one, the latter being the 
inclination in the literature on spatial commemoration where monuments and memorials are 
appraised for their ability to trigger ‘public discourses’, constitute ‘public spaces’, and/or 
enhance ‘public participation’. 
[2] The other statement is unsigned and synopsizes the speech a Minister of State delivered at the 
site in 2010 when he became the first-ever government representative pay it a commemorative 
visit. 
[3] That a distinct sense of confrontationality inheres in the concept of meydan is also traceable 
in such Turkish-language idioms as meydan okumak (to challenge; literally: to read meydan) 
and hodri meydan! (I dare you!). 
 
Figures 
[Figure 1] The site of the arson attack as seen a couple of months after its transformation into the 
Science and Culture Centre (source: the author). 
 
 
[Figure 2] The Science and Culture Centre’s Memory Corner (source: the author). 
 
 
[Figure 3] The site of the arson attack as seen on 2 July 2012 towards the end of the annual 
commemoration held in central Sivas by those upholding the victims’ legacy (source: the 
author). 
 
